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Atomic Weapons Program, Soviet 
     The Soviet atomic weapons program began during World War II through 
domestic scientific research and development efforts lead by nuclear physicists 
Igor Kurchatov (1903-1960) and Andrei Sakharov (1921-1989) and assisted by 
captured German scientists.  These programs also involved foreign espionage by 
individuals such as Klaus Fuchs (1911-1988) and Ethel (1915-1953)and Julius 
Rosenburg (1918-1953) targeting the United Kingdom and United States.  
Enhancing their nuclear arsenal through espionage against the U.S. and NATO was 
an ongoing Soviet goal during the Cold War era. 
     These efforts succeeded in producing the first Soviet atomic bomb exploded on 
August 29, 1949 at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan.  The first Soviet hydrogen bomb 
exploded on August 12, 1953, also at Semipalatinsk.  Subsequent decades saw the 
Soviets develop an extensive nuclear weapons research and testing program and 
various locales including Krasnoyarsk, Sverdlovsk, and Tomsk. 
     This program featured a nuclear weapons triad covering air-, land-, and sea-
based legs whose sized continually increased and eventually surpassed the U.S. 
nuclear deterrent.  This arsenal consisted of intermediate range nuclear missiles 
such as the SS-20 which threatened Western Europe; the SS-18 ICBM. whose 
11,000 kilometer range made it capable of reaching the United States;, the 
Typhoon class SLBM SS-N-5 missile with a 1,650 kilometer range; and the Backfire 
and Blackjack nuclear bombers.   Moscow’s arsenal eventually reached a size of 
8,043 warheads in 1981, with some of these being capable of delivering multiple 
strikes to divergent targets from a single missile. 
    For several decades the Soviet nuclear weapons program was a major factor in 
international politics and security.  Its potential use in the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis and the specter of its use in other Cold War confrontations limited the 
flexibility of the United States and allied countries to militarily pressure the 
Soviets for fear of Moscow’s military retaliation. 
     The Soviet nuclear weapons buildup continued despite rhetoric from Soviet 
leaders about the dangers of a nuclear arms race; their advocacy of arms control 
agreements with the United States such as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I 
(1972) and ABM Treaty (1972), which they never intended to keep, and 
repeatedly broke; and active and unsuccessful propaganda and intelligence 
efforts to keep the United States and its NATO allies from deploying Pershing II 
intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe in 1983. 
     An extensive nuclear doctrine was also developed by the Soviet military 
governing the use of these weapons.  Characteristics of this doctrine included 
preemption or first strike capability, quantitative superiority since a nuclear war 
could be of extended duration, counterforce targeting, combined arms operations 
supplementing nuclear strikes, and defense against nuclear weapons attacks.    
     During the 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev the Soviets expressed increasing 
concern against U.S. efforts to develop ballistic missile defenses through the 
Reagan Administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”).  Both sides 
held off on deploying ballistic missile defenses, but research into these systems 
continued and the U.S. would eventually withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2001. 
          The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 resulted in the dispersal of its nuclear 
arsenal to successor states such as the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine-- although these weapons would eventually be consolidated into the 
Russian Federation.  The early years of the Russian Federation saw hard economic 
times which negatively impacted the Soviet nuclear weapons workforce.  Many 
scientists lost their jobs due to government spending reductions and moved to 
the licit and illicit international nuclear markets to offer their expertise to 
prospective employers.  There was also international concern over securing the 
Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal which the U.S. addressed by establishing the  
Nunn-Lugar program in November 1991 providing funding and technical expertise 
to safeguard and dismantle Russia’s large stockpiles of weapons of mass 
destruction and delivery systems. 
     The Soviet atomic weapons program left a legacy of environmental damage in 
many areas of the former Soviet Union.  The Russian Federation retains significant 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and using nuclear weapons remains a significant 
part of Russian military doctrine two decades after the Soviet Union’s collapse.  
Russia’s withdrawal from Nunn-Lugar in October 2012 raises additional questions 
about Russia’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. 
                                                                                                                 Bert Chapman 
See also: ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty; Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); 
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(1903-1960); Sakharov, Andrei Dmitrievich (1921-1989); SALT I (November 1969-
May 1972) 
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